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LABOR COSTS AND MIDTERM WORK RELOCATION:
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OR BREACH OF CONTRACT?-
International Union, United Automobile Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In International Union, United Automobile Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board (UAW v. NLRB), I the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that it was not an unfair labor practice
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 when an employer
threatened to relocate certain operations 3 from a union plant to a nonunion
plant in order to coerce the union into making midterm wage concessions.4
Nor was it an unfair labor practice when the employer then carried out the
threat to relocate after the union refused to make the wage concessions.5
The D.C. Circuit decision affirmed on appeal the Supplemental Decision
and Order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) in Milwaukee
Spring 11,6 but on a different legal basis. The Board decision in Milwaukee
Spring 11 was an attempt to establish a broad per se rule permitting midterm
relocations unless prohibited by an express provision in the collective
bargaining agreement. 7 This was a direct reversal of the previous Board
rule, applied in Milwaukee Spring 1, 8 which restricted midterm relocations
if motivated by a desire to avoid the terms of an existing collective
bargaining agreement, unless a specific provision in the agreement autho-
rized the employer to make midterm relocation decisions. 9
This Note analyzes the union's legal theory and the court's response, and
considers additional arguments not presented by the union or discussed by
the court. This Note then analyzes the effect of the D.C. Circuit decision on
1. 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1982)).
3. In this Note, a work "relocation" is moving work and equipment from one plant to another
within the control of a single employer. A work "transfer" is moving work, but not equipment, from one
plant to another. A work "reassignment" is moving work from one group of employees to another
within the same plant. "Subcontracting" or "contracting" is moving work from the company's
employees to an independent entity with employees not employed by the original company. Some
decisions use the terms "transfer" and "reassignment" interchangeably.
4. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F2d at 184.
5. Id.
6. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring I), 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984),
aff'd, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The D.C. Circuit decision was written by Judge Harry T.
Edwards.
7. Id. at 602.
8. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring !), 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982),
remanded without opinion, 718 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 208.
1273
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:1273, 1986
the Board's new rule, and predicts the result in varying factual circum-
stances. This Note concludes that when an employer's predominant
motivation is to avoid the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in
order to realize a greater return in an enterprise, the threat of a midterm
relocation is not only a prohibited interference with employee rights, but
also a breach of contract under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. This Note predicts that unions may utilize the breach of contract
action in the future to circumvent the current Board's political stance
favoring nonintervention. 10
I. PRIOR LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MIDTERM
RELOCATIONS
A. The Recognition Clause and Jurisdictional Guarantees
Before the decisions in Milwaukee Spring I, Milwaukee Spring II, and
UAW v. NLRB, the Board and the federal appellate courts had developed a
framework for evaluating midterm relocation decisions. I I In University of
Chicago, 12 the Board found that the University of Chicago violated section
8(d), (a)(5), (a)(2),1 3 and (a)(1) of the NLRA when it transferred custodial
work from one bargaining unit to another, 14 after bargaining to impasse. 15
10. From the union perspective, the Reagan Board has undermined employee rights by restructur-
ing established principles of labor law. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to
Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 23 (1985).
From the management perspective, the Reagan Board has rejected radical experiments undertaken by
the Board during the 1970's, and has returned to normalcy. Id.
11. This legal framework was based primarily on § 7, 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), and 8(d) of the
NLRA. Section 7 defines the rights guaranteed to employees, which includes the right to bargain
collectively and the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. NLRA § 7; 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Section 8(a)(l) contains a broad prohibition on the interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7. Section 8(a)(3) makes discrimination in order to discourage
union membership an unfair labor practice, if in regard to tenure or any term or condition of
employment. Section 8(a)(5) makes a refusal to bargain collectively, as defined in § 8(d), an unfair
labor practice. NLRA § 8(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5).
Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain collectively. Included in this definition is: the duty to bargain
in good faith over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment (mandatory subjects);
the duty to follow a specified procedure, without strike or lockout, in order to modify an existing
collective bargaining agreement upon expiration (§ 8(d)(I)-(4)) and; the right to refuse to discuss or
agree to a midterm modification. NLRA § 8(d); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
12. 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). The Board's
decision adopted the recommended Order of the administrative law judge. 210 N.L.R.B. at 190. The
panel that decided University of Chicago was composed of Chairman Miller and Members Jenkins and
Kennedy. Id.
13. Section 8(a)(2) makes employer domination of a labor union an unfair labor practice.
14. University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. at 199.
15. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 944 (7th Cir. 1975). Although the Board did not
indicate whether the parties had bargained to impasse, the Seventh Circuit indicated that they had. Id.
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The basis of the Board's decision was that the recognition clause 16 in the
collective bargaining agreement embodied the prior bargaining history
between the union and the employer, creating a jurisdictional guarantee
that the work would remain with the union. 17
The Seventh Circuit in University of Chicago v. NLRB 18 rejected the
Board's decision and denied enforcement. 19 The court held that unless
work transfers are specifically prohibited by the collective bargaining
agreement, the employer is free to transfer work out of a bargaining unit if it
bargains to impasse over the decision20 and is not motivated by antiunion
animus21 in making its decision.22 The court concluded by noting that the
University of Chicago had based its decision to transfer work from one unit
to another on the need to raise the level of sanitation to the standards
required by the professional staff.23 The employer was not trying to avoid
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Three years later in Boeing Co., 24 the Board again extended the recogni-
tion clause of a collective bargaining agreement to confer a jurisdictional
guarantee that all of Boeing's tack welding work would be given to union
welders. 25 The Board found that it was a violation of section 8(a)(5) and
(a)(1) of the NLRA for Boeing to reassign some tack welding operations to
members of a different union26 engaged in cutting and fitting work. 27
16. A recognition clause describes the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, including the
employer, the divisions involved, the employees covered, and the employees' bargaining representa-
tive. See I TIE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 852-53 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
17. University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. at 198. Because some of the employees within the first
union transferred to lower paying positions in the second union, the Board also found that the employer
had modified the wage provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
18. 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).
19. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d at 949.
20. The court cited Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). According to
Fibreboard, an employer must bargain in good faith with the union over "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." Id. at 210 (citing NLRA § 8(d)). This duty is limited to subjects not
expressly covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
21. The court cited Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965).
According to Textile Workers, a partial closing is an unfair laborpractice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated by
a desire to discourage organization of employees. Id. This is antiunion animus.
22. University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d at 949.
23. Id.
24. 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978). As in University
of Chicago, the Board adopted the recommended Order of the administrative lawjudge. 230 N.L.R.B.
at 696.
25. Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. at 704.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 697. Between the decisions in University of Chicago and Boeing, the membership of the
Board changed. The panel that decided Boeing, Chairman Fanning and Members Penello and Murphy,
distinguished the recognition clause in the University of Chicago collective bargaining agreement from
the recognition clause in the Boeing agreement. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698. In University of Chicago, the
clause merely described the custodial employees as "Janitors in the Biological Sciences Division," a
1275
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Once again, the Board's extension of the recognition clause was re-
jected, this time by the Ninth Circuit in Boeing Co. v. NLRB. 28 The court
distinguished between the effect of a recognition clause, which describes
people, and a jurisdictional clause, which describes functions, and held
that the recognition clause did not guarantee that all welding work, includ-
ing tack welding, would be given to the welder's union. 29 Citing University
of Chicago v. NLRB, the court held that unless transfers are specifically
prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement, an employer is free to
transfer work out of a bargaining unit if it bargains to impasse and is not
motivated by antiunion animus. 30 Like the Seventh Circuit in University of
Chicago v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit in Boeing v. NLRB found that the
employer's motivation was not to avoid the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, but to increase efficiency in production. 3 1
B. Indirect Midterm Modification
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Boeing v. NLRB, the Board held
in Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co.32 that the employer had violated
section 8(d), (a)(5), (a)(3), and (a)(1) of the NLRA by relocating its
recreational sales operation during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement from its union facility at the Los Angeles Marine division to a
nonunion facility at the California Marine division. 33 The basis of the
Board's finding was not that the recognition clause conferred jurisdictional
guarantees, as the Board had found in University of Chicago and Boeing,
but that the relocation was an unlawful midterm repudiation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement as a whole.34 The Board held that to allow the
employer to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement by
relocating the operations from the facility named in the recognition clause
would be to allow the employer to do indirectly what it could not do
directly.35
classification added by agreement of the parties. 210 N.L.R.B. at 194. In Boeing, the recognition clause
was based upon certification rather than agreement and contained a long and detailed description of the
unit members. 230 N.L.R.B. at 698, 704.
28. 581 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1978).
29. Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d at 796.
30. Id. at 797. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
31. Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d at 797.
32. 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979). As in University of
Chicago and Boeing, the Board adopted the Decision and Order of the administrative law judge. 235
N.L.R.B. at 720.
33. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. at 737-38.
34. Id. at 737.
35. Id. at 735. The Board also found that the termination of union employees incident to the
relocation was inherently destructive of employee interests in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the
NLRA. Id. at 736.
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This time, the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v.
NLRB36 enforced the Board's decision.37 The court, in agreement with the
Board's reasoning, held that because an employer cannot alter the terms of
an existing collective bargaining agreement before its expiration, Los
Angeles Marine had repudiated the agreement by relocating the operations
to avoid the union labor rates, economic necessity notwithstanding. 38
The employer's motivation emerged as the deciding factor in analyzing
relocation cases from the dicta in University of Chicago v. NLRB and
Boeing Co. v. NLRB and from the holding in Los Angeles Marine Hardware
Co. v. NLRB. If the reason for relocating was to avoid the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, then the relocation, transfer, or reassign-
ment was a midterm repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement. On
the other hand, if the employer's motive was to increase efficiency or to
raise quality standards rather than to avoid the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, the employer was free to relocate after bargaining to
impasse. This rule could only be modified by an express provision in the
collective bargaining agreement. 39
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF UAW v.
NLRB
A. The Events Preceding the Charge
Illinois Coil Spring Company, an automobile parts manufacturer, oper-
ated three divisions. The employees at the Holly Spring and Milwaukee
Spring divisions were organized by two separate locals under the United
Auto Workers (UAW). 40 The employees at the McHenry Spring division
were not represented. 41
The company first approached the union on January 26, 1982, and
requested that the union forego a wage increase scheduled for April 1.42 On
March 12, after losing a major contract, the company proposed relocating
36. 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d at 1309.
38. Id. at 1307.
39. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 E2d at 949 ("unless transfers are specifically
prohibited by the bargaining agreement," the general rule applies).
40. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America CUAW or union).
41. Milwaukee Spring !, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
42. Id. The collective bargaining agreement between Milwaukee Spring, the respondent, and the
UAW, the charging party, was effective from April 1, 1980 to March 31, 1983, and applied to 99
bargaining unit employees, 35 of whom worked in the assembly operations. Id. The agreement was not
unusual. Along with other typical provisions, the collective bargaining agreement contained a manage-
ment rights clause, see infra note 80, and a "zipper" or integration clause. See infra note 77.
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the assembly operations to the nonunion McHenry Spring division because
of significantly lower wage rates paid to the employees there.43 On March
22, the company informed the union that it was willing to bargain over
alternatives to relocating the assembly operations, expressly noting that its
labor costs were $10.00 per hour at Milwaukee Spring and only $5.85 per
hour at McHenry Spring. 44 The next day, the union informed the company
that the employees had voted against accepting the McHenry Spring labor
rates, but that the union was still willing to negotiate further.45 On March
29, the company presented a proposal to the union in a document entitled
"Terms Upon Which Milwaukee Assembly Operations Will Be Retained in
Milwaukee," which the union members rejected on April 4.46 On April 8,
1982, after Milwaukee Spring announced its decision to relocate the
assembly operations to McHenry Spring, the UAW filed an unfair labor
practice charge. 47
B. Milwaukee Spring I
In Milwaukee Spring 1,48 the first Decision and Order issued in this case,
the Board relied on Los Angeles Marine49 and found that the employer's
decision to relocate the facilities because of a desire to obtain lower labor
costs was a midterm modification of the collective bargaining agreement in
43. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
44. Id. This labor cost differential between Milwaukee Spring and McHenry Spring was $4.15 per
hour for each of the 35 employees working in the assembly operations at the Milwaukee Spring division.
Given that there was approximately one year remaining on the Milwaukee Spring collective bargaining
agreement, the total differential was $302,120 (assuming 2080 annual labor-hours per employee).
45. Id.
46. Id. Milwaukee Spring requested a total wage reduction of $1.62 per hour for all employee
classifications. This included deletion of a scheduled wage increase, a reduction in the base rate, and the
elimination of an incentive pay program. Brief for UAW and its Local 547 at 9, UAW v. NLRB, 765
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Over the year remaining on the collective bargaining agreement, this would
amount to a savings for Milwaukee Spring of $333,590 for the 99 employees represented by the union.
See supra note 44.
47. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 206. The union charged a violation of § 8(a)(1), (a)(3),
and (a)(5) of the NLRA. Id. After filing the preliminary pleadings, the parties filed a stipulation of facts
and requested that the proceeding be transferred to the Board, waiving a hearing before an admin-
istrative law judge. Id. Because the facts were stipulated by the parties, there were no questions of fact to
be decided by an administrative law judge. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 16, at 1603.
In a footnote in the later D.C. Circuit decision, Judge Edwards questioned why this issue was not
submitted to arbitration as a contract grievance. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 182 n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1985). Apparently both the Board and the union viewed repudiation of collective bargaining agreements
as an inappropriate issue for arbitration. See Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720,
720 n. 1 (1978) (an employer's repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement is an inappropriate issue
for arbitration), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
48. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
49. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208-09. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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violation of section 8(d), (a)(5), and (a)(1) of the NLRA. 50 The Board
emphasized that in both Milwaukee Spring I and Los Angeles Marine the
employer sought to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
and that this was prohibited even though the situation was created by
external economic conditions. 51
The Board also found that neither the preamble of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, containing a description of the parties' physical location,
nor the management rights clause provided a clear and unmistakable waiver
of the union's statutory right to object to a midterm relocation. 52 The effect
of Milwaukee Spring I was to reaffirm the rule established by the Board and
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Marine:53 an employer may
not remove union work during the term of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, if done to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
unless specifically authorized by the agreement.
C. Milwaukee Spring II
After the Decision and Order in Milwaukee Spring I, Milwaukee Spring
appealed to the Seventh Circuit and the Board cross-appealed for enforce-
ment.54 Meanwhile, the composition of the Board changed with the ap-
pointment of new members by President Reagan, 55 and the new Board filed
50. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210. See supra note 11. The Board also found, as in Los
Angeles Marine, that the termination of union employees, incident to the decision to relocate the
facility, was inherently destructive of employee interests in violation of § 8(a)(3) and (a)(1) of the
NLRA. 265 N.L.R.B. at 210.
51. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208-09.
52. Id. at 209-10. The statutory right arises from NLRA § 8(d): "[Ihe duties so imposed shall not
be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any [midterm] modification." See
Milwaukee Spring !, 210 N.L.R.B. at 209.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
54. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1984).
55. Milwaukee Spring I was decided by Chairman Van de Water, a Reagan appointee who was
unable to secure Senate confirmation, and Members Fanning and Jenkins, Carter reappointees whose
terms expired shortly after Milwaukee Spring I was decided. See Millspaugh, Midterm Plant Reloca-
tions: The NLRB PutsHumptyDumpty TogetherAgain, 35 LAB. L.J. 289,290 n.6 (1984); Nominations
of Ronald Reagan, 17 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 883 (Aug. 17, 1981) (Van de Water); Nominations of
Jimmy Carter, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1471 (Aug. 28, 1978) (Jenkins), 13-WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1509 (Oct. 10, 1977) (Fanning). Milwaukee Spring II was decided by Reagan appointees
Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis. Member Zimmerman, a holdover Carter ap-
pointee, dissented. See Millspaugh, supra, at 290 n.8; Nominations of Ronald Reagan, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 396 (Mar. 14, 1983) (Dennis), 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 134 (Jan. 31, 1983)
(Dotson), 17 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 809 (July 27, 1981) (Hunter); Nominations of Jimmy Carter,
16 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1052 (June 9, 1980) (Zimmerman).
Because Board members are appointed for five years at staggered intervals, a new presidential
administration can secure a majority of appointed members in no more than three years. See NLRA
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a motion with the Seventh Circuit to remand the case to the Board for
reconsideration. On August 4, 1983, the court granted the motion. 56
In its Supplemental Decision and Order in Milwaukee Spring /,57 the
Board reversed its earlier Decision and Order in Milwaukee Spring 1.58 The
Board held that in order to find a midterm modification within the meaning
of section 8(d), a specific term in the collective bargaining agreement must
have been modified. 59 The Board noted that the decision in Milwaukee
Spring I did not indicate any specific term that was modified by the decision
to relocate. 60 The Board found that the wage and benefits provisions were
left intact at the Milwaukee Spring facility and that the collective bargain-
ing agreement's recognition clause did not confer jurisdictional rights on
the union. 61 Finding that the relocation was not a matter that was contained
in the collective bargaining agreement, the Board held that the company
had fulfilled its obligation to bargain by bargaining to impasse with the
union. 62 Finally, the Board in Milwaukee Spring II expressly overruled
prior Board decisions that had held that the decision to relocate union work
to nonunion facilities was a midterm modification of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 63 The Board held that unless relocations are specifically
prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement, an employer is free to
§ 3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Once a majority is reached, it is common for the Board to recall and reverse
decisions of the previous Board, especially if the previous Board members were appointed by an
administration of a different political party. See George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter
in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REv. 667, 668 n.14 (1984).
56. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
57. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984).
58. Milvaukee Spring H1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
59. Id. at 602.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 603. The Board found the decision in Milwaukee Spring I to be a radical departure from
previous Board rulings, citing Ozark Trailers, Inc, 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), to emphasize the value of
rational midterm economic discussion. 268 N.L.R.B. at 603. In Ozark, the Board noted the numerous
occasions in which unions had made midterm concessions in order to save jobs that were threatened by
proposed plant relocations. 161 N.L.R.B. at 570. The employer in Ozark, however, had not bargained
over the decision to shut down the plant and subcontract the work, and the Board found this to be a
refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject and an unfair labor practice. Id. at 562. The Board in
Milwaukee Spring I1 relied on this decision to suggest not that Milwaukee Spring was obligated to
discuss the issue of relocation with the union, but that Milwaukee Spring was therefore free to discuss
the issue at any time. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603.
63. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604. In overruling University of Chicago, Boeing, and
Los Angeles Marine, the Board cited dicta in University of Chicago that stated that it was well
established that an employer could transfer work during the midterm of a collective bargaining
agreement, as opposed to reassigning it, after bargaining to impasse. University of Chicago, 210
N.L.R.B. at 190. The Board reasoned that this statement undermined the reliance in Los Angeles
Marine (1978) on the decision in Boeing (1977), which in turn had relied on University of Chicago
(1974). Milvaukee Spring I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604.
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relocate work out of the bargaining unit after bargaining in good faith to
impasse. 64
Board Member Zimmerman dissented, proposing a two-stage analysis
to be used in relocation cases. 65 In this proposed analysis, the Board would
first determine whether the relocation decision is a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the NLRA. 66 If the decision to relocate is a mandatory
subject, the Board next would determine whether the relocation decision
was predominantly motivated by a desire to avoid the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. 67
After finding that the decision to relocate the assembly operations was a
mandatory subject of bargaining, Member Zimmerman moved to the
second stage of the proposed analysis. Because the parties had stipulated
that the relocation was motivated solely by Milwaukee Spring's desire to
avoid the higher labor rates under the collective bargaining agreement,
Member Zimmerman would find a midterm repudiation of the collective
bargaining agreement under section 8(d) of the NLRA.68
64. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604 (citing University of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 514
F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975)). See supra text accompanying notes 18-22. The Board also found that before
the employer's actions could be found to be inherently destructive of employees' rights under § 8(a)(3),
a refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject not contained in the contract must first be found. Because
the company had bargained in good faith to impasse before relocating, the company had fulfilled its
obligation to bargain and therefore did not violate § 8(a)(5) or (a)(3). 268 N.L.R.B. at 604.
65. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
66. Id. Mandatory subjects of bargaining include wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981). "Terms orconditions
of employment" is not defined in the NLRA, but this determination is governed by the Supreme Court
decisions in Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), and First Nat'l Mainte-
nance, 452 U.S. 666, and by the Board decision in Otis Elevator Co. (Otis 11), 269 N.L.R.B. 891
(1984). If the value to labor relations and collective bargaining outweighs the burden on the employer's
freedom to manage its business, the subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining. First Nat'l Mainte-
nance, 452 U.S. at 679. In First Nat'l Maintenance, the Court expressly reserved finding whether a
plant relocation is a mandatory subject of bargaining, id. at 686 n.22, but the Board in Otis!! applied the
balancing test to a relocation decision. 269 N.L.R.B. at 891. If the decision to relocate turns on labor
costs, it is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id.
67. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 605 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
68. Id. The Board decisions in Milwaukee Spring I and Milwaukee Spring ! are the subject of
various commentaries. For casenotes questioning the Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring 11, see,
e.g., Note, Milwaukee Spring Division oflllinois Coil Spring Company: WorkRelocation asaMeans to
Obtain Midterm Contract Concessions, 33 CATH. U.L. Rav. 1001 (1984); Note, Labor Law-Unfair
Labor Practices-Trade Unions-Collective Bargaining-An Employer's Relocation of Work During
the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreementfor the Sole Purpose of Reducing Labor Costs is Not a
Midterm Modification of a Term or Condition of Employment andDoes Not Violate the National Labor
RelationsAct if the Employer Has Bargained to Impasse with the Union Over the Decision, 53 U. CIN.
L. REv. 837 (1984).
For journai articles that view Milwaukee Spring ! as a necessary correction, see, e.g., Klaper, Return
to Normalcy: NLRB ReaffirmsRight of Employer to Relocate Workfrom Union toNonunion Facility, 27
REs G sTrE 484 (1984); Millspaugh, Midterm Plant Relocations: The NLRB Puts Humpty Dumpty
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III. UAW v. NLRB
The union appealed the decision in Milwaukee Spring II to the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, primarily because the Board
failed to address the union's argument. 69 The union had argued that Mil-
waukee Spring's use of economic pressure-the threat to relocate union
work-to force midterm wage concessions, and then carrying out the threat
by effectively locking out the employees, was a violation of section 8(d),
(a)(5), (a)(3), and (a)(1) of the NLRA. 70 Milwaukee Spring argued several
alternate positions, but primarily that the management rights clause
granted the employer the right to make relocation decisions. 7'
The court discussed the general legal principles regarding the duty to
bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. 72 If a man-
datory subject is not "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement,
the employer must bargain to impasse with the union over the proposed
subject. 73 Once impasse is reached, the employer may unilaterally imple-
ment its proposal without the union's consent.74 If the subject of the
proposal is "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement, neither
party may unilaterally modify the collective bargaining agreement without
the other's consent. 75
A mandatory subject may be "contained in" a collective bargaining
agreement either by express reference or by waiver of the duty to bargain by
the operation of a "zipper" or integration clause. 76 The court noted that the
collective bargaining agreement in this case contained a zipper clause, 77 a
Together Again, 35 LAB. L.J. 289 (1984).
69. Brief for UAW and its Local 547 at 11, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 4. See also UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 183.
71. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 181. See infra note 140.
72. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 179-80.
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 179-80.
76. Id. at 180. A zipper clause has the effect of bringing all mandatory subjects of bargaining
within the 'contained in" category for the purpose of determining the duty to bargain during the term of
a collective bargaining agreement. Id. A zipper clause purports to close out bargaining over subjects not
included in the collective bargaining agreement. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 471 (1976).
See also I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 16, at 642. Mandatory subjects can also be brought
within this category by bargaining during negotiations. Jacobs Mfg. Co.. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1228
(1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). See also R. GORMAN, supra, at 458-62.
77. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 181. The zipper clause read as follows:
Entire Agreement Clause
It is acknowledged that during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement. that each
party had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any
subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the
understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and
opportunity are set forth in the Agreement. Therefore, the Company and the Union, for the life of
the Agreement. each waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to
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fact that the parties, the General Counsel, and the Board had previously
failed to address. 78 The court reasoned that the union must have conceded,
and the Board must have found, 79 that the right to relocate the assembly
operations was explicit in the management rights clause, which granted to
Milwaukee Spring the right to manage the plant and business.80 Otherwise,
the zipper clause would have closed out the issue until the term of the
collective bargaining agreement had expired. 81
After building this analytical framework, the court then addressed the
union's argument. Because the right to relocate the assembly operations
was expressly granted by the management rights clause, the court could not
see "how two rights can make a wrong. '' 82 In other words, if Milwaukee
Spring had the right under the NLRA to propose a midterm wage reduction
to the union, and the right under the management rights clause to relocate
any operation, then it could not be wrong to couple these two rights
together in a single proposal to the union.83
bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to or covered in this Agreement,
or with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement,
even though such subject or matter may not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of
either or both of the parties at the time they negotiated or signed this Agreement.
Joint Appendix at 47, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
78. See infra note 136.
79. The court noted that the Board's analysis in Milwaukee Spring H was blurred. 765 F.2d at 183
n.30. The Board held that Milwaukee Spring had not violated § 8(a)(5) because it bargained to impasse
with the union. Id. If Milwaukee Spring did in fact have the right to relocate under the management
rights clause, it had no obligation to bargain over the decision at all. Id. The Board did more than "blur"
its analysis. It is evident from Milwaukee Spring ! that the Board overlooked the zipper clause, ignored
the management rights clause, and treated the issue as if it were not "contained in" the collective
bargaining agreement. Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603.
80. UAW v. NLRB, 765 E2d at 181-82. The management rights clause read as follows:
FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT
Except as expressly limited by the other Articles of this Agreement, the Company shall have the
exclusive right to manage the plant and business and direct the working forces.
These rights include, but are not limited to, the right to plan, direct and control operations, to
determine the operations or services to be performed in or at the plant or by the employees of the
Company, to establish and maintain production and quality standards, to schedule the working
hours, to hire, promote, demote, and transfer, to suspend, discipline or discharge for just cause or
to relieve employees because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, to introduce new and
improved methods, materials or facilities, or to change existing methods, materials or facilities.
Joint Appendix at 24.
81. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 182. In fact, both the Board and the union failed to address the
application of the management rights clause, leaving the court to assume that the right to relocate was
conceded to fall within the clause. Id.
82. Id. at 183.
83. Id. The court observed that the flexibility that exists by allowing the parties to bargain midterm
over rights conferred by the collective bargaining agreement is crucial in order to address effectively the
unanticipated events and changed circumstances that continually occur in labor relations. Id. at 184.
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IV. MIDTERM ECONOMIC PRESSURE
A. The Economic Pressure Theory and the Court's Response
The union argued that Milwaukee Spring's actions were contrary to the
requirements in section 8(d) governing the duty to bargain and therefore
were a violation of section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5). 84 The argument was not that
the relocation itself was a midterm repudiation of the collective bargaining
agreement, but rather that the threat to relocate unless the union agreed to
wage concessions was illegal economic pressure, and that carrying out the
threat was an illegal lockout. 85 For this argument, the union relied on
section 8(d). 86
Section 8(d) describes the duties imposed on both the employer and the
union during negotiations for new collective bargaining agreements. In
addition, section 8(d) imposes special duties on a party who proposes a
midterm modification of an existing agreement, which include notification,
negotiation, and a prohibition on strikes and lockouts until the existing
agreement expires. Section 8(d) also grants to the other party a right to
refuse to discuss or agree to any midterm modifications.87 A failure to meet
these requirements constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(5), 88 which
makes a refusal to bargain collectively an unfair labor practice.8 9
84. Brief for UAW at 12.
85. Id. at 12-14.
86. Id. at 12-13.
87. The text of § 8(d) reads in relevant part as follows:
181(d) For the purposes of. . . section [8], to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
• . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or
modification . . ;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party ...
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service . . . ; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract . . . until the expiration date... :
The duties imposed . . . by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) . . . shall not be construed as requiring
either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a
contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before [expiration] of the
contract.
NLRA § 8(d); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
88. Brief for UAW at 12. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282,285(1957) (since § 8(d) defines
the duty to bargain collectively, a violation of § 8(d) constitutes a refusal to bargain collectively and an
unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5)).
89. See supra note 11.
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The union relied on interpreting the explicit restriction on strikes and
lockouts in section 8(d)(4) to imply a blanket restriction on the use of any
economic pressure to force midterm concessions, and on a broad reading of
the term "lockout." 90 The court rejected this argument for three reasons.
First, the court did not accept the generalization from the express statutory
language prohibiting strikes and lockouts to the implied prohibition of any
economic pressure, or the union's broad definition of "lockout."91 Second,
the court noted the lack of any legal precedent to support the argument that
the use of "generic" economic pressure during midterm negotiations was
illegal, or that the term "lockout" should be given such a broad reading. 92
Finally, given that the union had conceded that the employer had the
express right to relocate under the management rights clause of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the court would not find that it was unlawful for
Milwaukee Spring to offer to give up this right if the union voluntarily
agreed to a modification of the agreement. 93
B. Criticism of the Court's Response
The court's response to the union's argument is weakened by three major
considerations. First, in addition to the express prohibition on lockouts in
section 8(d)(4), section 8(d) superimposes upon the specific restrictions in
section 8(d)(1) through (d)(4) a right in either party to be free from generic
economic pressure aimed at a midterm modification of an existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 94 Second, general legal authority for the union's
argument exists in the congressional intent underlying the national labor
policy.95 Finally, because the union has a statutory right to be free from
midterm economic pressure, the management rights clause must provide a
clear and unmistakable waiver of this statutory right, rather than blanket
coverage, before it can be found to grant the employer the right to make
relocation decisions. 96
1. Generic Economic Pressure
The court interpreted the explicit reference in section 8(d)(4) to strikes
and lockouts as the sole forms of economic pressure prohibited by the
90. Brief for UAW at 14.
91. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 183-84.
92. Id. at 184.
93. Id.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 97-110.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 111-23.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 124-33.
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NLRA. 97 The union argued that these were merely express examples of an
implicit prohibition against any midterm economic pressure. 98 The union
also defined "lockout" broadly to include a refusal by an employer to
furnish available work to its regular employees for the purpose of gaining
concessions from them. 99 By trying to extend the prohibition on strikes and
lockouts to prohibit any midterm economic pressure, and extending the
prohibition against lockouts to cover closures or terminations in connection
with a threatened relocation, the union extended the statutory language
beyond what the court considered its intended coverage. 00 The court was
correct, under rules of statutory construction,101 to construe the limits on
economic pressure in section 8(d)(4) to be as expressly stated. However,
the court should have recognized and the union should have argued that
section 8(d)(4) need not control recognition of the statutory right to be free
from midterm economic pressure.
Section 8(d)(1) through (d)(4) outlines the procedures for modifying
collective bargaining agreements. 102 The text following superimposes upon
these procedures the broader right to refuse to discuss or accept midterm
modifications during the term of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. This right to refuse to discuss or agree to a midterm modification is
guaranteed by section 7; 103 to interfere or coerce the employees in the
97. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 183-84.
98. Brief for UAW at 14.
99. Id. (citing American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB. 380 U.S. 300, 321 (1965); 2 THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw, supra note 16, at 1034). At Milwaukee Spring, the employer did in fact withhold available
work from its regular employees by moving the assembly operations, but at that point it was no longer
seeking concessions. At most the threat to relocate was a threatened lockout, but not an actual lockout.
Furthermore, the relocation appears not to have been undertaken merely to pressure the union, because
the company resumed the same work at the McHenry Spring plant. On the other hand, if the union had
been able to show that the employer had offered to return the assembly operations to the Milwaukee
Spring plant if concessions were made, the continued withholding of available work should have been
construed as a lockout.
100. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 183-84.
101. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 2A SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.23 (4th ed. 1984). The literal meaning of this maxim is that the expression of one is the exclusion of
others, or that all omissions should be understood as exclusions. Id. However, it is a rule of statutory
construction and not a rule of law, and it can be overcome by a strong indication of contrary legislative
intent or policy. Id.
102. Section 8(d)(l) requires that the party requesting a modification serve written notice on the
other party 60 days prior to expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement. Section 8(d)(2)
requires that the requesting party offer to meet with the other party to negotiate a new contract with the
proposed modifications. Section 8(d)(3) requires that the requesting party serve notice on appropriate
mediation agencies within 30 days after a dispute arises. Section 8(d)(4) spells out the duty to continue
"in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the
existing contract." NLRA § 8(d)(1)-(4); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)-(4).
103. Activities described in § 7 are considered "protected," and include collective bargaining
activities by employees in general. Activities described in § 8(a) and (b) are considered "prohibited,"
but specific collective bargaining activities by unions that are excepted from the prohibitions in § 8.
1286
Vol. 61:1273, 1986
Midterm Work Relocation
exercise of this right should be a violation of section 8(a)(1) and (a)(5).104
Moreover, if the general right in section 8(d) to refuse to discuss or agree
to midterm modifications were construed as being limited by section
8(d)(4) to the specific right to be free only from strikes and lockouts within
the notice period at the end of an existing contract, the inclusion of this
general right would be superfluous because it would provide no additional
protection beyond the prohibition in section 8(d)(4). Also, if this general
right to be free from economic pressure were not construed to be superim-
posed upon the notice procedures, there would be no prohibition on strikes
and lockouts before the notice and waiting period defined in section 8(d)(1)
through (d)(4).105 Section 8(d), read as a whole, includes the general right
to be free from any economic pressure aimed at modification of the
collective bargaining agreement before its expiration. 106
Once the union's statutory right to be free from midterm economic
pressure is established, it must meet a balancing test before it is fully
recognized. The interference with this statutory right must outweigh the
business justification, unrelated to labor costs, 10 7 for the employer's
such as the right to refuse to agree to a midterm modification of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, should remain protected by § 7. NLRA §§ 7, 8(a), (b); 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a), (b).
104. See supra note 11.
105. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282,300-01 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (if the
latter part of § 8(d) were construed to permit strikes without notice, the only time a union could not
strike would be within the 60-day notice period at the end of an existing collective bargaining
agreement). The union cited authorities to illustrate when a strike would fall outside § 8(d)(4), but still
be prohibited by the superimposed prohibition. See infra note 112. However, the courts in the cited cases
found the strikes violated § 8(d)(1), and did not need to rely on the superimposed prohibition.
106. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 728 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (it is concededly an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(3) for a union to unilaterally coerce an employer to accept a midterm
modification of a collective bargaining agreement). Section 8(b)(3) is the union counterpart to
§ 8(a)(5), making a refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice. See supra note 11. For this proposition,
Truck Drivers cited NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957), where the Supreme Court authorized
midterm economic strikes during contract reopening provided by the collective bargaining agreement,
if within the notice requirements of § 8(d)(1)-(4). Lion Oil, 352 U.S. at 303.
During normal bargaining in the creation of a new collective bargaining agreement, § 8(d) "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession," but § 8(d) does
require discussion and it does allow the use of economic weapons after impasse is reached. NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,488-89 (1960). The congressional policy concerning the
modification of existing collective bargaining agreements, as opposed to the creation of new agree-
ments, is very different. See infra text accompanying notes 115-23. For this reason, § 8(d) requires
neither party "to discuss or agree to any modification ... if such modification is to become effective
before" the collective bargaining agreement expires. This language embodies a different policy than the
language quoted above regarding normal negotiations, and therefore cannot be construed as allowing
similar forms of economic pressure.
107. In applying the balancing test under § 8(a)(1), the business justification must be a substantial
and legitimate company interest in safety, efficiency, or discipline. Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v.
NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1077 (lst Cir. 1981). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 76, at 133.
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actions. 108 The section 7 right protected here is the union's right to refuse to
discuss or agree to midterm wage concessions. The only business justifica-
tion offered by Milwaukee Spring was a desire to realize a greater return on
its investment by reducing labor costs. 109 This justification is not sufficient
to tip the balance against the employee rights guaranteed in section 7. 110
2. Legal Authority and Underlying Policy
The court pointed out the lack of supporting precedent in rejecting the
union's economic pressure argument, 1I noting that the legal authorities
cited by the union refer to strikes, and not general economic pressure. 112
108. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965). The Court in
Textile Workers acknowledged that many management decisions interfere with employee concerted
activities, but held that § 8(a)(1) is only violated when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the
business justification for the employer's actions. Id. In Textile Workers, the employer closed down an
entire plant to avoid paying higher labor rates to a union that had just won a representation election. Id.
at 266. The Court's balancing test was used to weigh the employer's freedom to run its business against
the employees' freedom to engage in concerted activities. Id. at 268-69. The Court held that the
employer was free to terminate an entire plant for any reason, unless the purpose of the closure was to
derive some benefit by chilling unionization in the future or at another plant. Id. at 272-74.
109. The parties stipulated that Milwaukee Spring's sole motive for the relocation was to reduce
labor costs in order to realize a higher return on its investment. Milvaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. 206.
206.
110. In a direct violation of § 8(a)(1), the interference with the employees' § 7 rights need not be
intentional. It is enough that the effect of the employer's action tends to interfere with § 7 rights. NLRB
v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21,23 (1964); Textile Workers, 380 U.S. at 269; R. GORMAN, supra
note 76, at 132-33. However, because the § 8(a)(1) violation in this case was derivative by way of
§ 8(a)(5), Milwaukee Spring's subjective intent, rather than the objective effect, is determinative of a
§ 8(a)(1) violation. See I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 75-78. Milwaukee Spring's
subjective intent was to interfere with the employees' § 7 rights by coercing the union into accepting a
midterm modification of the collective bargaining agreement. See Milivaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B.
at 206. This should make Milwaukee Spring's business justification invalid and preclude its considera-
tion as a legitimate factor to weigh against guaranteed employee rights.
Although it is primarily the Board's role to apply its judgment, discretion, and expertise to this
balancing function, the circuit courts have a limited judicial review of Board findings. R. GORMAN,
supra note 76, at 133-34. The standard of review to be applied to the Board's determination ofquestions
of fact is one of deference if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
NLRA § 10(f); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). This is an enlarged standard of review that was broadened by the
Taft-Hartley amendments. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 at 560 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY]. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 484-87
(1951). In this case, there is no evidence that the Board applied the Textile Workers balancing test at all.
I 1l. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 184.
112. Id. at 184 n.32. The cases cited by the union, United Elec. Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223
F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), and Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949), both
involved midterm strikes by the unions and not generic economic pressure. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at
184 n.32. In United Elec. Workers, a dispute arose concerning the provision in the collective bargaining
agreement for a general wage increase. In response, the union held a full membership meeting,
accompanied by a work stoppage and walk out. United Elec. Workers, 223 F.2d at 340. The court found
this to be a strike in support of a demand for a midterm modification of the collective bargaining
agreement, in breach of a no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement and without notice
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The case authority is admittedly sparse, but except for the UAW v. NLRB
decision itself, there is also no specific legal precedent to oppose the
union's argument. The union relied on the general legal authority in the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act 13 and in the policy of midterm
stability that Congress intended to promote;' 4 the court did not acknowl-
edge this general legal authority.
The Taft-Hartley Act changed the law concerning the duty to bargain
during the midterm of a collective bargaining agreement.115 This change
included the provision in section 8(d) that rejects the duty to bargain over a
modification to a collective bargaining agreement before it expires. 116 This
amendment did not outlaw midterm bargaining but made it clear that any
bargaining must be voluntary. 117 The underlying policy is to allow the use
of economic weapons during the negotiation periods for new collective
bargaining agreements, because of the belief that this encourages agree-
ment, 118 but to discourage the use of economic weapons once agreement is
reached.' 19 The policy focuses on the sanctity of the written collective
bargaining agreement. Given the uneven balance of power in favor of the
employer in this type of relocation case and the policy favoring stability
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, the court should have
neutralized the use of economic pressure during the term of the agreement
by finding that Milwaukee Spring had engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice. 120
as required in NLRA § 8(d). Id. at 342. In Boeing Airplane, the union called a strike after the existing
collective bargaining agreement had expired. 174 F.2d at 989. The court held that this was in violation
of the interim agreement's no-strike provisions, which were still in effect by virtue of the union's failure
to give the company the required 60 days notice under NLRA § 8(d). Id. at 991. These cases are
distinguishable from UAWv. NLRB because they involved obvious violations of the notice provisions of
§ 8(d)(I)-(3).
113. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
114. Brief for UAW at 15-20. See generally LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 110.
115. H.R. CONF. REP No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), reprinted in LEGIsLATIVEHISToRY,
supra note 110, at 539.
116. Id.
117. 93 CONG. REc. 7002 (1947) (supplemental analysis by Sen. Taft of labor bill as passed),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 110, at 1625.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
119. See NLRA § 8(d); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d): "[The duties so imposed shall not be construed as
requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification [before expiration] of the contract."
Bargaining over midterm modifications therefore must be voluntary. See supra text accompanying
notes 115-17. A "coerced" concession, by definition, cannot be "voluntary."
120. In dicta near the end of his opinion, Judge Edwards reflected on the value of midterm
bargaining in dealing with unanticipated developments in labor relations. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at
184. Midterm bargaining is precisely what Congress sought to end with the Taft-Hartley amendments
by adding the provision in § 8(d) that rejects the duty to bargain over midterm modifications. See supra
text accompanying notes 115-19. Neither position (continuous bargaining or no midterm bargaining) is
ideal, but in a system that will necessarily diverge from perfection, the policy favoring stability is much
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Although there is little authority regarding the use of economic weapons
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, in NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' International Unionl2 l the Supreme Court discussed the Board's
regulation of economic weapons during negotiations for new agreements.
The Court recognized that the presence of economic weapons in reserve,
and their actual use on occasion, was a prime factor in compelling agree-
ment between the parties. 122 The Court stated that Board intervention in an
attempt to balance these economic weapons during negotiations amounted
to an entrance into the substantive aspects of the collective bargaining
agreement, in conflict with congressional intent. 123
This reasoning by the Supreme Court is consistent with the underlying
congressional intent, the national labor policy, and the restriction on
midterm economic pressure. The Board's role is to allow labor and man-
agement to utilize their legal economic weapons during negotiation, in
order to compel agreement. But once agreement is reached, the Board's
role is to preserve the sanctity of the written collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Board must do this not by enforcing the agreement, but by
neutralizing the illegal use of midterm economic weapons aimed at com-
pelling modification of the agreement.
The general legal authority exists in the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act, but has yet to be applied in a consistent and specific manner to
contemporary relocation problems. The D.C. Circuit in UAW v. NLRB had
the opportunity to develop relocation law in a manner consistent with the
sanctity of the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, the decision
becomes fuel for the perpetuation of coercive activities aimed at destroying
the stability of collective bargaining agreements.
3. The Management Rights Clause and Contractual Waiver
The union did not expressly concede that Milwaukee Spring had the right
to relocate under the management rights clause. 124 The court assumed that
the union conceded this right because the union failed to argue that the
zipper clause eliminated the duty to bargain over the relocation. 125 It is not
more workable.
121. 361 U.S. 447 (1960).
122. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 489.
123. Id. at 498. Accord Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 141 (1976).
124. The court relied on the union's "tacit concession" of Milwaukee Spring's right to-relocate
under the management rights clause. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 182. The court did not scrutinize the
management rights clause under the strict standards required of a contractual waiver because it did not
find a statutory right to waive. Id. at 183-84.
125. Id. at 182.
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clear why the D.C. Circuit was the first to raise the zipper clause issue, 126
but it is likely that the union did not view the zipper clause as determinative.
The effect of the zipper clause was undoubtedly weakened by the broad
management rights clause, perhaps to the extent of making the existence of
the zipper clause irrelevant to the subject of relocation. 127
Furthermore, the court erred in extinguishing the union's statutory right
to be free from midterm economic pressure with the employer's vague and
broad contractual right to manage operations at Milwaukee Spring. 128 The
Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts have consistently held that
before a contract clause can operate as a waiver of a statutory right, the
language in the contractual provision must be "clear and unmistakable." 1
29
126. See infra note 136.
127. A management rights clause can undoubtedly be worded in terms so broad as to cover any
decision regarding the content and distribution of operations at any plant. A zipper clause is only a
factor on the issue of work relocation if the management rights clause is narrow enough to leave some
plant operations outside its coverage. A zipper clause probably has much more applicability to
nonoperational activities that would never fall within a management rights clause, such as pension plans
and sick leave allotments.
128. Some of the functions reserved to management were "the right to plan, direct and control
operations, to determine the operations or services to be performed in or at the plant or by the employees
of the Company. . .or to change existing methods, materials or facilities." See Joint Appendix at 24.
If the language were loosely interpreted, the right to "control operations. . . at the plant" or the right
"to change existing . . . facilities" could be read to allow control of these operations and facilities
relative to the other plants. But if this point had been argued and closely analyzed in the D.C. Circuit
decision, the court should have found that this clause failed to provide the specificity required to waive a
statutory right, because the right to relocate was not explicit.
129. Milvaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209 (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325
F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964)). A general contractual provision will
not be read as a waiver of a statutorily protected right, unless the provision is "clear and unmistakable."
Metropolitan Edision Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). This fundamental principle is
consistently followed throughout the federal circuit courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 688 F.2d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 1982); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 633, 636
(2d Cir. 1982); George Banta Co., Inc., Banta Div. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1982); NLRB
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538
F.2d 1291, 1299 (7th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, even express language will not be read expansively.
Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Teamster Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (3d Cir.
1980); accord George Banta, 686 F.2d at 20.
In International Union, United Automobile Workers v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1967), a
clause in the collective bargaining agreement between General Motors and the union provided that "the
methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the
Corporation." Id. at 266. The court held that this was not a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of the
union's right to bargain where a change in "methods" amounts to contracting out work previously
performed within the bargaining unit. Id. at 267. See also Road Sprinkler Fitters Local 669 v. NLRB,
600 F.2d 918, 921-23 (D.C. Cir. 1979), where the court rejected the Board's failure to apply the "clear
and unmistakable" waiver standard. The Board argued that the rights should be determined by contract
interpretation rather than by traditional waiver concepts. Id. at 921. The court refused to accept the
Board's "recalcitrance" in not explaining why the standard for waiver should change in light of the
Board's "statutory mandate." Id. at 923; R. GORMAN, supra note 76, at 470-71 (a blanket management
rights clause without specificity is not a valid waiver of protected rights); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
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In Milwaukee Spring I, the Board found the management rights clause in
this collective bargaining agreement 130 did not contain an express right to
relocate operations from one plant to another. 131 Therefore, the clause did
not waive the union's right to refuse to agree to a midterm modification. 132
Although the decision to relocate arguably falls within the broad coverage
of the management rights clause, when used as a contractual waiver of a
statutory right, the right to relocate must be explicit. Regardless of the
effect of the zipper clause and the breadth of the management rights clause,
the union did not concede that it had contractually waived its statutory
right. 133
C. The Effect of UAW v. NLRB on the Rule in Milwaukee Spring II
Although the decision in UAW v. NLRB affirmed the Board's decision in
Milwaukee Spring II, it did so on different grounds. The effect is that the
rule formulated in Milwaukee Spring H remains undecided at the federal
appellate court level. Milwaukee Spring II formulated the rule that during
the term of an existing collective bargaining agreement, the employer is
free to relocate union work to nonunion facilities after bargaining to
impasse, regardless of motivation, unless an express provision in the
collective bargaining agreement preserves union work. 134 This is in sharp
contrast with the rule in Milwaukee Spring I, which held that an employer
LAW, supra note 16, at 643-44 (a mere catchall phrase in a management rights clause is not a specific
waiver).
130. See supra note 80.
131. Milwaukee Spring !, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210.
132. Id. Although the decision in Milwaukee Spring I was reversed by Milwaukee Spring II, the
Board in Milwaukee Spring II as well as the court in UAW v. NLRB did not address the contractual
waiver issue. The Board in Milwaukee Spring H did not find a statutory right at all, and therefore found
nothing to waive. 268 N.L.R.B. at 602. The court in UAW v. NLRB also did not acknowledge the
existence of the statutory right. 765 F.2d at 183-84. Therefore, the analysis in Milwaukee Spring I
concerning the requirements for a contractual waiver of a statutory right, and the application of these
requirements to the Milwaukee Spring collective bargaining agreement, is unaffected by the later
decisions in Milvaukee Spring H and UAW v. NLRB.
133. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. The requirement that a waiver be clear and
unmistakable applies to a waiver of a statutory right. Here, the statutory right was a distinct manifesta-
tion of the underlying policy Congress sought to promote by the Taft-Hartley amendments. See supra
notes 115-19 and accompanying text. The underlying policy, as well as the statutory right, should not be
discarded by a loose application of a broad and vague management rights clause.
The existence of a zipper clause in a collective bargaining agreement should not make the require-
ments for a contractual waiver of a statutory right any less stringent. The zipper clause does not make
the management rights clause any more or any less explicit concerning the right to relocate. It is
apparent that the court in UAW v. NLRB used the zipper clause to avoid deferring to the Board's
announcement of current relocation policy: that the right to relocate exists regardless of the provisions
in the management rights clause, as an inherent management prerogative. Compare UAW v. NLRB,
765 F.2d at 181, with Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603.
134. Milwaukee Spring H, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
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could not relocate union work if motivated by a desire to reduce labor costs,
unless the collective bargaining agreement contained an express provision
authorizing the employer to make relocation decisions. 135
In UAW v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit did not explicitly choose between the
rules from Milwaukee Spring I and Milwaukee Spring H. Instead, the court
introduced an element that the parties previously had not considered: the
effect of a "zipper" clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 136 The
court reasoned that because the union did not argue that the zipper clause
closed the issue of relocation during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement, the union must have conceded that the right to relocate was
granted to the employer in the broad management rights clause. 137 More
importantly, the court reasoned that the Board also must have believed the
right to relocate was expressly granted to the employer in the collective
bargaining agreement, because of the zipper clause. 138 As interpreted at the
appellate court level, the new Board rule regarding relocations seems
remarkably similar to the rule set out by the Board in Milwaukee Spring I,
which also required an express grant of the right to relocate. 139 However, by
not being explicit on this point, the decision adds a great deal of uncertainty
in predicting the current state of relocation law.
The zipper clause in the Milwaukee Spring collective bargaining agree-
ment shifted the focus to the management rights clause. Although Mil-
waukee Spring argued that the right to relocate fell within the management
rights clause, 140 this argument was not challenged by the union.141 The
court therefore did not need to decide whether the management rights
clause did in fact cover relocation. Although the court suggested that the
135. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 210. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
136. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 181-82. There are many possible explanations for the parties' and
the Board's failure to acknowledge the existence of the zipper clause in the Milwaukee Spring collective
bargaining agreement, but the most likely explanation is inadvertence. The existence of the zipper
clause precluded any obligation to bargain and therefore undermined Milwaukee Spring's argument and
the Board's finding that the employer's duty is merely to bargain to impasse. The existence of the zipper
clause confused the union's argument because it was not clear what the union's position was in regard to
the management rights clause.
137. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 182.
138. Id.
139. Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 209-10.
140. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 181. Milwaukee Spring argued three alternative positions. First,
Milwaukee Spring contended that the relocation was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, under
guidelines from Fibreboard and First Nat'l Maintenance. Oral Argument by Counsel for Milwaukee
Spring at 71, Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 134. In the
alternative, Milwaukee Spring argued that even if the relocation was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the management rights clause covered relocation. Id. Finally, Milwaukee Spring argued that even if the
relocation was a mandatory subject of bargaining and even if the management rights clause did not
cover the subject of relocation, the company had fulfilled its obligation by bargaining to impasse over
the relocation. Id. at 85, Joint Appendix at 145.
141. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 181.
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breadth of the management rights clause was sufficient to cover reloca-
tion, 42 the court relied on the union's "tacit concession" on this issue, and
did not rely on a finding that the management rights clause provided a clear
and unmistakable waiver of the union's rights. 143 The court did not scru-
tinize closely the coverage of the management rights clause primarily
because the court refused to acknowledge the union's statutory right to be
free from midterm economic pressure aimed at a contractual modifica-
tion. 144 Accordingly, the union must first carry the burden of showing a
statutory right exists before the court will apply the strict "clear and
unmistakable" waiver requirement to a management rights clause.
If the management rights clause had been narrower than it was in the
Milwaukee Spring collective bargaining agreement, the court might not
have found that the clause covered relocation, even without acknowledging
the union's statutory right. In that event, the zipper clause would have
precluded a relocation before the collective bargaining agreement expired.
If the collective bargaining agreement had not had a zipper clause, and if
the management rights clause had not covered relocation, the court would
have found that the company was free to relocate after bargaining to
impasse. 145
142. Id. at 182.
143. Milwaukee Spring had argued that the management rights clause not only granted the
company the right to make relocation decisions, but also provided an "unequivocal waiver" of any
rights the union may have on the issue. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
145. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at 179. The theory that a party can unilaterally carry out a midterm
proposal after bargaining to impasse evolved from Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951),
enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). The value of this theory to collective bargaining in a relocation
case is questionable because the bargaining is virtually meaningless. The employer need only hurry to
impasse and then proceed with the relocation. The employer need not conform to the notice require-
ments in § 8(d)(1)-(4) because the relocation is not a modification of the existing collective bargaining
agreement or a lockout under § 8(d)(4). The union's only response is a strike, which is not only
meaningless after the employer has already left, but arguably illegal because the existing collective
bargaining agreement has not yet expired. Butsee NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282,292-93 (1957)
(the use of economic weapons during contract reopening is not an unfair labor practice). See also Local
9735, Mine Workers v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (a midterm strike not for the purpose
of modifying the collective bargaining agreement is not an unfair labor practice); Cheney Cal. Lumber
Co., 319 F.2d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1963) (a strike in breach of no-strike provision in the collective
bargaining agreement is not per se a refusal to bargain and an unfair labor practice). Because of the
above inconsistencies, some commentators have suggested that an "addition" to a contract should be
treated as a "modification" under § 8(d). Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement. 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1125-32 (1950); Peck, A Proposal to EndNLRB
Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355, 365-68 (1985). If all mandatory subjects
were treated as "frozen" during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, this would create a more
stable period between negotiations, and perhaps the policy behind the Taft-Hartley amendments would
be better served. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20. Of course, the parties would at all times be
free to discuss voluntarily any unforeseen issue, or to utilize the grievance procedure provided in the
collective bargaining agreement concerning the interpretation or application of that agreement.
The court suggested that the right to relocate may be found under a theory of implied management
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The result from UAW v. NLRB is unsatisfactory to both management and
labor. The Board's new rule from Milwaukee Spring II remains untested at
the appellate level because in UAW v. NLRB the court did not decide the
case on the same basis as the Board. An affirmance of the rule in Milwaukee
Spring II by an appellate court is questionable because of the Ninth
Circuit's affirmance of the opposite rule in Los Angeles Marine, 146 which
prohibited relocations if motivated by a desire to avoid the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. An employer who follows Milwaukee
Spring's course risks an eventual rejection of Milwaukee Spring II by the
appellate courts. In any event, an appellate decision in conflict with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Marine would need to be resolved
in the Supreme Court. 147
Labor remains dissatisfied because the Board has been free to apply the
new rule from Milwaukee Spring II to other relocation cases. 148 A chal-
lenge to the rule from Milwaukee Spring II must work its way through the
Board before presentation to an appellate court. The challenge may be too
costly for such an unpredictable result. The D.C. Circuit's abrupt rejection
of the union's economic pressure argument will delay the full development
of this argument in the appellate courts, if not completely destroy it.
The D.C. Circuit's manipulation of the Board's decision in Milwaukee
Spring II was perhaps a signal to unions that the economic pressure
argument should be abandoned, and that the rule from Los Angeles Marine
should be revived. By not affirming the employer's inherent right to make
relocation decisions, the court has maintained a glimmer of the rule
developed by the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Marine; and by writing an
opinion that can be easily limited to its facts, 149 the court has avoided
issuing a decision that unions must struggle hopelessly to distinguish in the
future.
reserved rights, but expressed "no view on the legitimacy of this theory." UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d at
182 n.29. This theory provides that all rights not extracted from management by the collective
bargaining agreement are retained by management. Id. See I THE DEVELOPiNG LABOR LAW, supra note
16, at 643-44.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
147. Although the Board often reverses a previous Board rule, see supra note 55, court decisions
tend to be more stable, especially when the basis of the decision lies in law and not policy. A decision by
the Supreme Court would stabilize both the federal appellate courts and the Board on this issue.
148. Milwaukee Spring I1 was decided on Jan. 23, 1984 and UAWv. NLRB was decided on June 18,
1985. For Board decisions applying the rule from Milwaukee Spring 11, see Suburban Transit Corp.,
276 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Aug. 27, 1985) (supplemental decision of Davis, A.L.J. (Jan. 17, 1985)); Inland
Steel Container Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 129 at 1-2 (June28, 1985) (decision of Kaplan, A.L.J., at 10-12
(Jan. 14, 1985)).
149. The narrow facts were the existence of a zipper clause, a broad management rights clause, and
no challenge by the union to the assumed coverage of the management rights clause. Also, the union did
not ask the court to uphold the rule from Los Angeles Marine.
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V. BREACH OF CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATE REMEDY
A. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under the collective bargaining agreement, a condition precedent to
being paid the union wages is the performance of union work. Although the
employer is not expressly obligated to provide union work, implicit in every
contract is a concept of good faith and fair dealing, or more specifically, a
duty of cooperation. 150 Because a collective bargaining agreement is a
contract between the union and the employer, this concept applies to
collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA, imposing on the em-
ployer a duty to cooperate by not relocating union work to avoid the terms of
the agreement. 151
Although substantial overlap exists between conduct that is an unfair
labor practice and conduct that is a breach of contract,1 52 the NLRA
provides distinct remedies. 153 Unfair labor practice complaints are within
the jurisdiction of the Board and are prosecuted by the General Counsel. 154
The Board's role is to regulate the application of national labor policy.
150. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-32, at 443 & n.78 (2d ed. 1977).
"Good faith performance ... of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205, at 100 (1981). "Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even
though the actor believes his conduct to be justified." Id. "'[i1nterference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance" are examples of bad faith. Id. at 100-01.
151. See United Steelworkers, Local 4264 v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352, 356(10th Cir.
1959); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 495 F. Supp. 619, 636
(M.D.N.C. 1980), 'acatedon other grounds, 659 F.2d 1252(4th Cir. 1981); Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v.
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 222 F. Supp. 125, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Teamsters Local
961 v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D. Colo. 1980); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-97 (1959); Note, Labor Law-Labor Management Relations
Act-Federal Courts May Entertain Suits for Breach of Collective Bargaining Contract Even Though
Conduct Alleged May Also Constitute an Unfair Labor Practice, 74 HARV. L. REV. 622,622-23 (196 1).
A party can enforce a collective bargaining agreement in federal district court under § 301. Section
301(a) reads as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
NLRA § 301(a); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
152. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976) (the strong policy
favoring judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction
over conduct that is also an unfair labor practice).
153. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,452 (1957). The version of § 8 of the Taft-
Hartley Act originally included breach of the collective bargaining agreement as an unfair labor
practice, but was deleted because of the available remedy under § 301. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
81 (1947) (as passed Senate), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 110, at 239; 93 CONG. REC.
6600 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 110, at 1539.
154. NLRA § 3(d); 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
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Breach of contract complaints, on the other hand, are not within the
Board's jurisdiction, and may be brought by the union in any federal
district court with jurisdiction over the parties. 155
In United Steelworkers Local 4264 v. New Park Mining Co., 156 the union
alleged, among other things, that the employer discharged all employees
and then entered into leasing agreements with some of the former em-
ployees in order to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
and continue its mining operations. 157 The district court dismissed the case,
holding that the discharge was within the employer's management pre-
rogative, and at most an unfair labor practice and within the Board's
jurisdiction. 158 The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the federal district
court had jurisdiction under section 301(a) of the NLRA. 159 The court held
that every contract contains an implied covenant that neither party will do
anything that would destroy the other party's right to receive the fruits of
the contract. 160 The court acknowledged the employer's right to run its
business and its right to subcontract work unless the collective bargaining
agreement expressly prohibits subcontracting, but held that this action
cannot be a subterfuge for evading the obligations of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.' 61
The underlying facts in UAW v. NLRB were very similar to the facts in
New Park Mining. All parties conceded that Milwaukee Spring's motiva-
tion throughout was to avoid the wage provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 162 First, Milwaukee Spring attempted to persuade the union
to make wage concessions, later making threats to relocate in an attempt to
coerce the concessions. 63 Second, when the union refused to make the
wage concessions, the employer relocated the facilities to the McHenry
Spring site, where the labor rates were substantially lower. 164 As in New
Park Mining, the employer in UAW v. NLRB sought to avoid the labor wage
rates in the Milwaukee Spring collective bargaining agreement. The deci-
sion to relocate was a "subterfuge" for evading these obligations, and was
therefore a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Regardless
of whether the midterm repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement
155. NLRA § 301(a); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See also United Steelworkers, Local 4264 v. New Park
Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir. 1959).
156. 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959).
157. New Park Mining, 273.F.2d at 354.
158. Id. at 355.
159. Id. at 357-58.
160. Id. at 357.
161. Id.
162. Milvaukee Spring !, 265 N.L.R.B. at 206.
163. Id. at 207.
164. Id. See supra note 44.
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was a midterm modification and an unfair labor practice, it was neverthe-
less a breach of contract.
B. Unfair Labor Practice or Breach of Contract?
The Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring II demonstrates the difficulty
in applying section 8(d) to midterm relocation problems. 165 To find a
violation of section 8(d) when an employer relocates operations, as the
Board did in Los Angeles Marine166 and Milwaukee Spring 1, 167 the Board
must find an indirect modification of the collective bargaining agreement 168
or a repudiation of the agreement as a whole, 169 because no specific term in
the collective bargaining agreement is modified by the relocation. 170 Be-
cause this interpretation goes beyond the express language of section 8(d),
the Board was able to alter this application of national labor policy in
Milwaukee Spring II. Furthermore, the "midterm repudiation" rule from
Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring I required a finding that the
employer's subjective intent in relocating was to avoid the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement before the Board would find a midterm
modification. Because section 8(d) does not expressly address subjective
intent, the Board in Milwaukee Spring H easily replaced this requirement
with an objective, per se rule. 171
In Milwaukee Spring H and UAW v. NLRB, the union apparently was
aware that the midterm repudiation rule was soon to be overruled by the
Board, and chose a different theory on which to base its unfair labor
practice charge. This theory was the economic pressure argument, focusing
not on the relocation itself, but rather on the employer's threat to relocate
unless the union made midterm wage concessions. 1 72 This economic pres-
sure argument was ignored by the Board 173 and rejected by the D.C.
Circuit. 174 The economic pressure argument was easily rejected and the
midterm repudiation rule was easily replaced because these theories did not
have support in specific language in the NLRA, or a clear interpretation by
the Supreme Court.
Congress or the Supreme Court may eventually clarify the language of
section 8(d) to remove any doubt as to whether a relocation is an illegal
165. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
168. See supra text accompanying note 35.
169. See supra text accompanying note 34.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
173. See supra text accompanying note 69.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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midterm modification of a collective bargaining agreement, or whether the
NLRA prohibits the use of economic pressure aimed at forcing midterm
concessions. But until Congress or the Supreme Court takes such action,
and as long as the Board maintains its current posture, 175 unions should
also pursue a common law breach of contract action on the collective
bargaining agreement under section 301. The common law unquestionably
imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contractual relation-
ship without reliance on explicit statutory language. 176 Under the breach of
contract action, the parties' subjective motivation is the deciding factor and
a proper subject of inquiry. Under the unfair labor practice action, subjec-
tive motivation is a proper subject of inquiry only when the current Board
so holds.
VI. CONCLUSION
When an employer seeks to avoid the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, either by direct action or by indirect pressure, the Board should
find that the employer has committed an unfair labor practice. This finding
should be limited to cases similar to the situation at Milwaukee Spring,
where the employer's predominant motive was to avoid the express terms of
the collective bargaining agreement, such as labor rates, and where the
only business justification is a desire to realize a higher return in the
enterprise.
If the relocation is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because it is
motivated by factors unrelated to labor costs, then the employer should be
free to unilaterally relocate the business, after bargaining with the union
over the effects of the relocation. Likewise, if the business justification in
seeking to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement lies in
substantial financial risk to the employer, this may outweigh the adverse
effect on employee rights. Also, if the management fights clause grants the
employer the clear and unmistakable right to make relocation decisions,
the employer should be free to relocate.
Alternatively, given the current Board's reluctance to protect employee
rights, the federal district courts should find a breach of contract upon a
showing of similar facts. The basis for the breach is the employer's attempt
to avoid the collective bargaining agreement, in violation of the implied
covenant of good faith, fair dealing, and cooperation inherent in every
contract. Legitimate business necessity, or good faith, will excuse the
breach.
175. See supra note 10.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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The policy underlying the provisions in the NLRA governing unfair
labor practices under section 8 and breach of contract under section 301 is
stability of contract and industrial peace. The guidelines above provide a
workable framework for the resolution of midterm relocation cases while
protecting the legitimate interests of both labor and management. The
desire to create an easy per se rule is not sufficient reason to sacrifice
national labor policy and the interests of individual employees who have
invested much of their lives in a continuing employment relationship.
Bryan E. Lee
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